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5.1  Introduction 
Our aim  is  first  to  explain  why  Indonesia did  not  experience an 
external debt crisis in  the  1982-84  period  as did most of  the Latin 
American countries, and then, on the basis of our analysis, make rec- 
ommendations to deal with Indonesia’s present debt situation. We  hope 
that the lessons drawn will be useful as well in the design of adjustment 
policies for other countries experiencing debt-servicing difficulties. Our 
study goes beyond the normal economic analysis by giving detailed 
attention to the Indonesian historical and political setting within which 
decisions about policies are made. 
We  conclude that the major reason for the absence of a 1982-84 debt 
crisis was the satisfactory management of  the exchange rate, a task 
that was made easier because there were neither burgeoning budget 
deficits nor extended periods of loss of control over monetary growth. 
The absence of protracted exchange rate overvaluation from 1979 on- 
ward was fundamental in maintaining a strong nonoil tradable sector. 
The nonoil tradable sector was able to earn enough foreign exchange 
to service Indonesian debts when the external shock of high  interest 
rates increased debt-service payments and the recession in industrial- 
ized countries lowered the price of oil. We  also want to emphasize that 
the absence of extended exchange rate overvaluation kept the external 
debt down by not encouraging capital flight. We  ascribe this use of the 
exchange rate to protect the tradable sector as much to the existence 
of  an  influential political constituency consisting  of  (comparatively) 
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neoclassical  economists, Javanese peasantry and  Outer Island  resi- 
dents. as to balance-of-payments considerations. 
This chapter is organized as follows: sections 5.2 and 5.3 explore 
the historical and political dimensions of economic policymaking, and 
section 5.4 verifies the veracity of our political economy approach by 
looking at the distributional consequences of the fiscal system. Section 
5.5 reviews the conduct of  monetary policy and finds that the choice 
of the monetary  control mechanism  in the  1970s was influenced  by 
political economy considerations. Section 5.6  shows  how exchange rate 
management since November 1978 has been sensitive to both the eco- 
nomic  viability  of  the  agricultural  export  sector and  the  balance- 
of-payments position. Section 5.7 identifies three factors-concessional 
loans, prudent debt management, and export orientation-responsible 
for the non-crisis outcome in 1982-84, and then estimates their relative 
contribution. Section 5.8 discusses the prospects of Indonesia avoiding 
a future external debt crisis, and the role for policy in ensuring such 
an outcome. 
5.2  Political and Economic Instability, 1950-65 
An understanding of the economic conditions prior to the establish- 
ment of the New Order government in  1966 is important because the 
economic policies of the 1950-65  period left a very strong imprint on 
the institutional memory of the new government, especially insofar as 
it resides in the person of President Soeharto. During this period, the 
Indonesian government was preoccupied  with  domestic political and 
military problems,  with  the restoration of  sovereignty on West Irian, 
and with  political  recognition  in  world  forums. Little  attention and 
resources were devoted to economic development. 
An increasingly difficult budget situation made inflation a major prob- 
lem. Taxes on trade were the major source of government revenue, but 
the overvalued multiple exchange rate system was reducing the prof- 
itability of the tradable sector, causing it to shrink. The twin rebellions 
on the islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi in  1958 constituted a simulta- 
neous supply and demand shock to the budget. The rebellions forced 
large increases in military expenditure at the same time that the gov- 
ernment revenue base was reduced because both of these islands were 
important sources of export tax revenue. The monetization of the bud- 
get deficits raised the average 1958-61  inflation rate to 25 percent from 
the 1950-57  average of 17 percent. 
The budgetary pressures grew steadily worse, resulting in a period 
of high inflation in 1962-65.  Between 1962 and 1964 both money supply 
and the cost-of-living index roughly  doubled every year, and by  the 
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slowed to 0.8 percent per year in this turbulent period. The evolution 
of the export-to-GDP ratio tells the story of  economic decline very 
well; it fell from 8.7 percent (1951-57)  to 6.8 percent (1958-61),  and 
then to I.  1 percent (1962-65). 
The internal political struggle culminated with the abortive coup by 
military  personnel  sympathetic to the  Indonesian  Communist Party 
(PKI) on the night of 30 September 1965. The political instability ag- 
gravated the economic instability. The increasing economic difficulties 
speeded up the transfer of authority from President  Soekarno to the 
anti-Communist General Soeharto in the following year. 
5.3  The Political Economy Factors in Policymaking 
The economic chaos of the 1958-65  period left such a deep impres- 
sion that the new Soeharto government has had a “balanced”  budget 
rule since 1968. In reality, this rule amounts to refusing to finance the 
deficit through money creation and to limiting the deficit to the avail- 
ability of foreign loans, which is officially described as foreign “rev- 
enue’’.* Another consequence of the chaos was the recognition that 
the exchange rate is an extremely potent policy instrument  that can 
effect  large-scale  economy-wide  resource  reallocation  and  income 
redistribution. 
President  Soeharto has been in power since October 1965 and has 
not faced any serious challenges to his rule since the 1974 riots. The 
Indonesian  political  system  can  be  described  as  a  bureaucratic- 
authoritarian state with implicit corporatist features. We  can identify 
three political concerns that have significantly influenced his choice of 
economic policies.  The first  is  avoiding conditions favorable  to the 
revival of the PKI. Since the PKI was primarily a Javanese peasant- 
based movement, the policy implication is that conditions in the rural 
area must  be improved.  The second concern is to display equitable 
treatment of  the Outer Islands, given their long history of  secessionist 
movements. Since the economy of the Outer Islands depends heavily 
on tree crop exports, this further strengthens the case for promoting 
agricultural development.  It must be added that Soeharto, because of 
his peasant origin, has consistently  shown a strong personal commit- 
ment to eliminating rural poverty. Soeharto’s third concern is one com- 
mon to all politicians: the maintenance of his power base. 
Political patronage has often taken the form of trade restrictions to 
benefit specific groups. It would not be correct, however, to attribute 
all trade restrictions to rent-seeking motivation. Ideology also plays an 
important role.  Soeharto, like most members of the  1945 generation 
who fought  in  the bitter  war for independence, is  influenced  by  an 
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nationalism. Dutch economic policies were seen as designed to impose 
a plantation economy on Indonesia to serve the need of Dutch man- 
ufacturing industries for raw materials. In reaction, the generation of 
I945 regards  industrialization  as synonymous with  economic devel- 
opment. The policy  translations  of economic nationalism are estab- 
lishing high trade barriers to induce the development of a manufacturing 
sector, and enacting foreign investment laws more strict than those of 
neighboring countries. 
The primary reason why Indonesia sometimes pursues a contradic- 
tory mix of liberalizing and protectionist policies is because of the above 
political, ideological, pecuniary, and personal elements working them- 
selves through two groups of contending presidential economic advi- 
sors, popularly referred to as the technocrats and the technicians. The 
technocrats are mostly economists of  neoclassical persuasion who work 
at the Ministry of Finance and the National Planning Body (BAPPENAS). 
Their acceptance of the comparative advantage principle leads them 
to emphasize the development of the nonoil export industries, partic- 
ularly agricultural commodities and labor-intensive manufactured goods. 
This has meant a favorable treatment of the agricultural sector because 
it supplies about 80 percent of nonoil exports. Exchange rate deval- 
uations rather than the removal of trade barriers  on imported inputs 
are used to promote exports. This is because the technocrats control 
the ministries that oversee macroeconomic policies, but not the Min- 
istry of Trade and the Ministry of Industry which have authority over 
quantitative restrictions. Their policies  find favor with the president 
because they  address his political concerns for raising rural  income 
and for maintaining equitable treatment toward the main islands. 
The second group of economic advisors, the technicians, is an amor- 
phous collection of technicians-turned-managers, military advisors, and 
economists with structuralist inclinations. The technicians are united 
by their common belief  in the general validity of the infant industry 
argument, and by their common rejection of foreign capital ownership. 
They see state enterprises-like  the oil company, Pertamina, until its 
downfall-as  the vehicle to achieve these two objectives. This position 
allies the technicians  with  members of the intelligentsia  who see the 
state enterprises as the way to counterbalance Chinese domination of 
the corporate sector. 
The technicians’  push for import-substitution  industrialization has 
also won them the support of the army, the most powerful constituency 
in the country. Thanks to the dual function (dwijiingsi) doctrine that 
legitimizes military participation in economic development, the expan- 
sion of state enterprises translates directly into more managerial  po- 
sitions for senior military personnel. It must be noted that since most 
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prices of manufactured goods represents an implicit tax on the residents 
in the rural sector and in the Outer Islands. 
In looking at the political setting within which policies are chosen, 
we have identified an important political coalition of technocrats, Outer 
Islanders, and rural residents which favors a policy package empha- 
sizing the maintenance of  a competitive exchange rate. Since a debt 
crisis occurs when a government runs out of a foreign reserves-either 
to service its guaranteed external debts or to permit private residents 
to convert their domestic currency to service private external debts- 
such a policy package reduces the probability of adebt crisis by keeping 
the (foreign exchange earning) nonoil export sector healthy. 
5.4  The Fiscal System 
The most notable feature of  the  1970s is the central government’s 
increasing reliance on oil as its chief source of  revenue. Oil revenue 
as a  share of  total  federal  revenue  rose  from  26  percent  in  1969- 
70 to peak at 71  percent in  1981-82.  Nonoil revenue  normalized  by 
GDP  fell  from  the  1969-71  average  of  8  percent  to  the  1980-82 
average of  6  percent.  The fiscal danger of  such  a narrow  tax  base 
was  brought  home  dramatically  in  1982  when  the  global  recession 
caused oil prices to collapse. Oil  revenue, expressed in  1980 rupiahs, 
fell  from  Rp  7.8 billion  in  1981-82  to  Rp  6.9 billion  in  1982-83, 
causing real total revenue to fall for the first time since the Soekarno 
years. 
It  was  clear that  greater  internal  resource  mobilization was  nec- 
essary. A completely revised personal and corporate income tax code 
came  into force  in January  1984, a  value-added  tax  in April  1985, 
and  a  consolidated  property  tax  in  1986. The result  was  that  real 
nonoil  revenue  (1980 prices) rose  from  Rp 3.6 billion  in fiscal  1983 
to Rp  4.7 billion  in fiscal  1986.  It is  important  to note  that  the oil 
revenue  contributed to “undertaxation”  in  a subtle way  which led 
to greater external debt accumulation. The two OPEC price increases 
encouraged  undertaxation  by  giving  Indonesia  access  to  external 
credit  on  very favorable terms. 
Woo’s (1987a) examination of  the fiscal system supports our claim 
that the technocrats favor an economic strategy that leads to resource 
transfers to the Javanese rural areas and the tree crop industries in the 
Outer Islands. The secular decline in trade taxes and the low taxation 
of  land relative to income reflect Soeharto’s political concerns about 
communism and  secession, as well  as the  technocrats’  neoclassical 
inclination toward the comparative advantage doctrine. This favorable 
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of trade and hence encourages the production of tradables, the presence 
of which determines a country’s ability to service its debts. 
In examining government expenditure, Woo (1987a) surmised from 
fragmentary evidence that government spending was more likely to 
display a rural rather than an urban bias. In the absence of more detailed 
data, disproportionate weight was given to the budget allocations for 
fertilizer subsidies, irrigation projects, rural school programs, the vil- 
lage public works programs, and food subsidies. With better data, we 
were able to garner stronger evidence to support the hypothesis that 
budget allocations were very sensitive to interisland equity. There is 
in fact evidence that interisland equity takes precedence over rural- 
urban equity. This is consistent with  our conjecture that the concern 
for rural development is based more on the eradication of poverty than 
on narrowing the rural-urban gap. 
The analysis in this section sets the stage for the following discussion 
in which we find that political economy factors have been important 
in determining the debt outcome. To  the extent that people are con- 
sistent in their actions, the fact that the technocrats implemented, with 
Soeharto’s approval, a fiscal policy  that favored the tradable sector 
means that they would also advocate a similarly-oriented exchange rate 
policy. Such an exchange rate policy, as we will see, yields side effects 
which are salutary to external debt servicing. 
5.5  Monetary Policy and Financial Structure 
While the balanced  budget  policy of the Soeharto government ef- 
fectively  ended the creation of money  to finance  budget deficits, it 
could not prevent monetary policy from moving in tandem with fiscal 
policy during the 1970s. This is because the main instrument for mon- 
etary control prior  to April  1974 was the extension  of central bank 
credits to the banking system, state enterprises, and private companies. 
Since these credits were extended for a contracted time period, the 
government was not in a position to engineer quick  increases or re- 
ductions of the money stock. This meant that with the maintenance of 
a fixed dollar-rupiah exchange rate, the conversion of  the oil revenue 
from dollars to rupiahs in order to finance the expanded government 
expenditure automatically increased the money supply. Thus, when the 
price of oil quadrupled at the end of  1973, encouraging the government 
to increase its spending, the monetary  authorities  lost control of the 
money supply. Reserve money grew 57 percent in 1974 and the inflation 
rate for that year was 41 percent. The Central Bank responded to this 
monetary anarchy by setting lending ceilings on the banking system in 
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It is understandable to use lending ceilings as a shortrun, stopgap 
measure to control monetary growth, but Indonesia continued to rely 
upon them for monetary  control until June 1983, despite their well- 
known deleterious effects. The reason is that the credit ceilings gave 
the government an additional  instrument  to consolidate  its political 
base. Over time, Bank Indonesia was instructed to introduce detailed 
ceilings by type of credit for each bank through an extensive selective 
credit system featuring subsidized interest rates to achieve other goals. 
For example, banks were assigned a civic function by their restricting 
certain credit only to pribumis  (indigenous people) and establishing 
credit for them as a priority in order to enhance pribumis participation 
in economic activities. The highest priority items were the financing 
of rural participation in the government’s rice intensification program, 
and the financing of a scheme to stabilize the price of rice. Since most 
priority credits were handled by the state banks, the policy of  ceilings 
with selective credit became one of the major tools protecting the state 
banks from competition with private banks. Since the state banks also 
have a wider network  of branch offices than the private  banks, this 
mechanism of monetary control preserved the dominant position of the 
state banks. In the absence of pressure to innovate in order to be more 
efficient, the Indonesian financial system remained underdeveloped. 
One of the policy responses to the external shocks of the 1980s was 
an overhaul of  the financial structure which was announced in June 
1983. The financial reform  package  included  partial  deregulation  of 
interest rates, elimination of credit ceilings, and reduction in the scope 
of Bank Indonesia’s subsidized credits to state-owned banks. To in- 
crease the amount of central bank instruments for open market oper- 
ations,  Bank  Indonesia  began  reissuing  Debt  Certificates  (SBI) in 
February 1984 and introduced Money Market Instruments (SBPU) in 
January 1985. 
It is clear that the financial instruments SBI and SBPU still do not 
provide sufficient control over monetary aggregates. This is evident in 
the way the money supply had to be contracted in response to a spec- 
ulative  run  on the rupiah in June 1987. The minister of planning, in 
addition to asking Bank Indonesia to sell Rp 800 billion of open market 
instruments, ordered the state enterprises to withdraw Rp 1.3 trillion 
from state banks to be placed in central bank securities. 
This action reveals that the market for both SBI and SBPU is still too 
shallow. It may be difficult to increase their role if the financial markets 
remain underdeveloped. Financial deepening is an important priority, 
but  not  only  because of  the need  to enhance  the  effectiveness  of 
the monetary instruments. Financial deepening would also better mobi- 
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external credit, and improve the overall allocation of capital within the 
economy. A boost to financial deepening would be the privatization of 
some of the state-owned enterprises, and an easing of external debt ser- 
vice would be achieved if  foreigners were allowed to buy into these 
enterprises. 
5.6  Exchange Rate Policy 
Indonesian exchange rate policy is characterized by  three distinct 
phases in the 1966-87  period. The first phase is from October 1966 to 
July 1971, in which there was a steady dismantling of the multitiered 
exchange rate system into a unified exchange rate. This phase revealed 
a readiness  to have  medium-sized  devaluations  at short intervals in 
order  to  restore  competitiveness eroded  by  the  high  inflation  in 
Indonesia. 
In the second phase, from August  1971 to October 1978, there was 
a  fixed  exchange  rate. The reason  for this  remarkable  stability  is 
straightforward: the balance of payments was very strong throughout 
the period. The rapid development of  the oil sector together with the 
1973 OPEC price increase caused Indonesian oil exports to grow as 
follows (in U.S. $ billion): 0.4 in  1969, 0.9  in  1972, 5.2 in 1974, and 
then 7.4 in  1978. The result was the swelling of the nongold reserves 
(measured in the number of weeks of imports they could support): 8.1 
in 1969,19.1 in 1972,20.2 in 1974, and 20.4in 1978. The macroeconomic 
conditions also did not  warrant  any additional stimulus which  a de- 
valuation would bring. The sustained high income growth rates of this 
period-7.9  percent  per  year-were  achieved  with  substantial over- 
heating  of  the  economy.  The  average  1973-78  inflation  rate  was 
22 percent compared with 8 percent in  1970-72. 
The third phase involved three large devaluations in November 1978, 
March 1983, and September 1986, separated by moderately long periods 
of gradual exchange rate depreciation. There are two, mutually com- 
patible, explanations for the 50 percent devaluation in  1978. The first 
explanation views the November  1978 devaluation primarily as an an- 
ticipatory action to the inevitable dropoff in oil export earnings due to 
resource depletion. 
The second  explanation  emphasizes the economic difficulties  and 
political tensions associated with the reallocation of resources being 
forced upon the economy by the overvalued exchange rate. The over- 
valuation  of  the rupiah  was  the result  of  maintaining  the exchange 
rate at 415 rupiahs to the dollar despite the large domestic inflations 
from 1974 to 1977. This meant that Indonesian producers of tradables 
were experiencing a profit  squeeze. The prices of  their output were 
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inputs were being driven up by the double-digit inflation. The result 
was reports of increasing unemployment in  the tradables industries, 
particularly in the labor-intensive agricultural export sector. Indonesia 
was  suffering from the “Dutch  disease.”  In this  view,  the  1978  de- 
valuation was as much due to political concern about worsening con- 
ditions in the countryside, as to economic concern about the desirability 
of the resulting composition of economic activities. After all, the level 
of reserves in  1978 could sustain the existing amount of imports much 
longer than was possible at any time during the 1969-76  period (see 
table 5.1, column e). 
It must be stated that the deleterious effects of the Dutch disease 
on the nonoil export sector are not obvious. Nonoil nonLNG exports, 
whether measured  in  physical  units  or  in  dollars  or  in  the units  of 
imports  for  which  they  can  be  exchanged,  show  steady  growth 
throughout  1972-78  (see table  5.1, columns  a, b, and  c).  The pro- 
duction disincentive faced by  the nonoil  export industries is clearly 
seen only when one measures the amount of local purchasing power 
of  their  exports  (see column  d).  Even  though  the  nonoil  exports 
were  bringing  in  increasing  amounts  of  foreign  goods,  the  steady 
real  appreciation  of the exchange rate meant that the nonoil export 
industries were not being paid a greater number of baskets containing 
the  mix  of  goods typically  consumed by  Indonesians. In terms  of 
foreign purchasing power, the nonoil export industries increased their 
revenues by  32  percentage points  between  1973 and  1978, but  their 
revenues were unchanged  if  measured  in  terms of  local  purchasing 
power. 
More direct evidence of the production  disincentive  is  the move- 
ment  of  prices  of  tradables  relative  to prices  of  nontradables, PT/ 
PN. The three proxies of PT/PN in table 5.1 show an average decline 
of  29 percent  between  1973  and  1978.’ The 50 percent nominal  ex- 
change  rate devaluation  caused PT/PN  to  increase by  29  percent, 
almost restoring  the profitability of  the tradable sector. 
The speed and size of the response of nonoil nonLNG exports were 
impressive. Export volume went up by 36 percent in one year, raising 
dollar earnings by 52 percent. The 32 percent growth in foreign pur- 
chasing power in  1979 translated into a domestic purchasing  power 
increase of 78 percent. 
We interpret the quick and large response to the devaluation as  proof 
of the Dutch disease, the mounting severity of which since 1974 caused 
excess capacity in the traditional export industries to increase. Small 
producers of tree crops were spending more and more of their time in 
nontradable activities. Meanwhile, the real prices of their agricultural 
products sank as a constant nominal exchange rate was maintained in 
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Table 5.1  Background to the November 1978 Devaluation 
Performance of Nonoil NonLNG Exports (1974 =  100) and Foreign Reserves Position 
(a)  (b)  (C)  (d)  (e) 
Nonoil nonLNG exports measured in terms of  Nongold Reserves 
Measured in 
Foreign  Domestic  Number of Weeks 
Physical  Purchasing  Purchasing  of Current Level of 









































































Indicators of Tradable-Nontradable Price Ratio (PTIPN), 1974 =  100 
Jan-Oct 




indexa  75.0  82.2  91.6  100.0  87.2  74.5  66.3  65.3  73.7  70.5 
price index"  63.9  65.8  91.6  100.0  66.4  65.6  71.7  70.4  93.3  93.8 
measureb  114.1  127.1  120.3  100.0  87.3  74.8  74.2  79.6  111.3  101.1 
Norest Physical volume (col. a)  from deHating rupiah value series by nonoil export price 
index. Foreign purchasing power (col. c) from deflating US$ value series by export unit 
value of industrial countries. Domestic purchasing power (col. d)  from deflating rupiah 
value series by Indonesian CPI. 
"DeHated by Jakarta CPI housing component. 
hThe competitiveness measure is  from inverting the Morgan Guaranty real  exchange 
rate. 
The March 1983 and September 1986 devaluations were undertaken 
to boost nonoil exports in the face of large declines in oil export earn- 
ings. Manufacturing exports grew very rapidly after the March  1983 
devaluation. They jumped (in US $ million) from 850 in fiscal 1982, to 
1480 in fiscal  1983, and to 2166  in fiscal  1984. The strong export re- 
sponses to the 1978 and 1983 devaluations indicate that export-oriented 
industrialization is a real possibility as long as favorable relative prices 
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While it is clear that negative external demand shock had a role in 
worsening the balance of payments from 1983 to 1986, we want to point 
out that there were also internal developments during this period that 
caused substantial movements in relative prices which were unfavor- 
able for the tradable sector. Specifically, we are referring to the wide- 
spread use of quantitative restrictions (QRs) in the 1980s. Of the 5,229 
items imported in  1985, 1,484 required import licenses and 296 were 
under quotas. The import licenses were usually given to only two or 
three traders, or to the few firms producing the competing goods do- 
mestically,  and thus conferred a monopoly position to their holders. 
The range  of  activities  protected by  import licenses  accounted for 
32 percent of total domestic value added, excluding construction and 
services. If the petroleum sector, which requires no protection, is also 
excluded, then the coverage is 53 percent of total domestic value added. 
The implication of this microeconomic distortion for exchange rate 
management  is  profound. The intrusion  of  this distortion since late 
1982 and its quick metastasis across the tradable sector renders invalid 
trying to draw conclusions  about production  incentive by  examining 
the movements of the macroeconomic  proxies for PT/PN. Output prices 
of tradables are set by international competition, while those of  non- 
tradables (which are generally very labor-intensive) are set by the do- 
mestic cost structure, the level of which  is primarily  determined by 
domestic wages on the supply side and domestic macro conditions on 
the demand side. Hence, the introduction of a quota on an imported 
input to the tradable sector will reduce the profitability of the tradable 
sector without any change in PT/PN. 
The point we want to emphasize is that although the Morgan Guar- 
anty competitiveness index in predevaluation  1986 shows almost the 
same value as in  postdevaluation  1979 (110 versus  Ill), it does not 
mean that the August 1986 exchange rate was not overvalued. In order 
to have the 1986 nonoil export supply schedule in the same position 
within the familiar Marshallian price-quantity  space as in  1979, a de- 
valuation was warranted, especially in light of  the shrunken gap be- 
tween output and input  price^.^  It is of course an empirical question 
how much the additional nonoil export earnings would have been in 
the absence of QRs, especially in comparison to the fall in oil export 
earnings. The current account deficit would still have widened in  1986, 
but it may not have doubled as it did.5 
5.7  External Debt Management 
The Soeharto  government  is no  stranger  to  external debt  management: 
it inherited an external public debt of $2 billion. It cut its teeth on the 
economic stabilization and rehabilitation program of 1966, within which 
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inflows to support the balance of payments were key components. Given 
the desperate situation of Indonesia, the western countries set up the In- 
ter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) to ensure a long-term co- 
ordinated plan of official  assistance. IGGI was generous both in the amount 
and the terms of assistance. In the 1967-70 period, it gave an average of 
$477 million a year, with a repayment period of 25 years which included 
7 years of grace and an interest rate of 3 percent. 
The mix  of  generous external assistance and corrective economic 
policies undertaken by  the Soeharto government imparted a new dy- 
namism to the Indonesian economy. The annual average growth rate 
from  1968 to 1972 was 8.2 percent compared to the average rate of 
1.2 percent in the preceding five years. By 1974, the international credit 
markets had rescinded whatever credit restrictions they had imposed 
on borrowing by  the Indonesian government in the aftermath of  Soe- 
karno’s  economic Armageddon.  The  reasons  for this  change  were 
threefold: one, the avalanche of oil revenue increased the creditworthi- 
ness of the Indonesian government; two, the boom in commodity prices 
in the early  1970s; and, three, the decreased lending opportunities in 
the OECD countries whose  medium-term economic prospects  were 
rather bleak after the 1973 OPEC price increase. 
On consumption-smoothing  grounds, the readmission  into the ex- 
ternal credit market resulted in a net gain to Indonesian national wel- 
fare. This welfare gain was not without its price: Indonesia was now 
exposed to two kinds of new risks. The first risk is systemic in nature 
and is a threat to every country with external debts. The second is the 
possibility of imprudent borrowing by Indonesia. This danger was re- 
alized in February 1975 when the state oil company, Pertamina, could 
not roll over a $400 million short-term loan and defaulted. 
It could be cogently argued that the Pertamina crisis was a blessing 
in disguise. The government, by  denying all state-owned enterprises 
direct access to the external credit market after the Pertamina embar- 
rassment, did not  have as large a publicly-guaranteed  external debt 
when 1982 began as it otherwise would have had. 
A common explanation for an external debt crisis puts the blame on 
excessive budget deficits that force the government to borrow from 
abroad. The statistic usually cited in  support of  this fiscal imbalance 
view is the ratio of official long-term debt to GNP, DGNP.6 The official 
long-term debt is taken to represent  the cumulated amount of fiscal 
deficits financed by external borrowing, and the normalization by GNP 
is to indicate the extent to which the country has been made to live 
beyond its income by the budget deficits. 
The fiscal imbalance explanation of an external debt crisis points out 
that DGNP for Mexico rose from 9.1 percent in 1970 to 18.7 percent 
in  1981, the  eve of  the debt  crisis; and for Brazil  it  rose from 7.1 
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ernments increased their budget deficits significantly during this pe- 
riod, but  it  is not true that  they  had  been  more  profligate than  the 
Indonesian government. The 1981  DGNP for Mexico, Brazil and In- 
donesia is  18.7 percent, 17.0 percent, and  17.7 percent, respectively. 
There are just not enough differences in  the  1981 DGNPs to explain 
why Indonesia avoided a debt crisis in the two years that followed. 
It  must  be  mentioned  that  DGNP is  a flawed  indicator of  public 
profligacy. First, the stock of long-term official debt can understate as 
well as overstate borrowing for budgetary reasons. This is because the 
government can borrow short term to finance budget deficits and long 
term to finance foreign market interventions. Second, DGNP is a mea- 
sure of profligacy only in the sense of living beyond income, and not 
in the sense of being unable to service the acquired external debt. To 
indicate the latter one would have to normalize the external debt by 
the  level of  exports-the  foreign exchange earning capacity of  the 
country. 
As pointed out earlier, a debt crisis occcrs not only when the gov- 
ernment does not have the reserves to service the loans it has guar- 
anteed, but also when it does not have the reserves to enable private 
domestic residents to convert their service payments on the nonguar- 
anteed debts from domestic currency to foreign currency.’ To take the 
second cause of  a debt crisis into consideration, we define the total 
external debt service to be the sum of  external short-term debt plus 
the debt service on all external long-term debt, publicly-guaranteed and 
private  nonguaranteed. We  include short-term debt in  our definition 
because we are interested in the financial resilience  of  a country to 
sudden protracted credit squeezes in international credit markets that 
make short-term borrowing extremely expensive, if  not occasionally 
impossible. After all, the 1973-74 credit crunch did precipitate the 1975 
Pertamina debt crisis in Indonesia, and the 1980-81  financial squeeze 
precipitated the PEMEX crisis in Mexico. 
Since the reserve position of the country is crucial for avoiding debt 
crises, it is not appropriate to assess the country’s ability to pay by 
looking at the total external debt service with respect to its income. A 
more appropriate indicator is the debt-service ratio, DSO-the  total 
external debt service normalized by the level of exports-because  the 
official reserve position is determined primarily by  the ability of the 
export sector to earn foreign exchange. 
Table 5.2 summarizes the basis for our choice of  three factors to 
explain why Indonesia did not experience a debt crisis in  1982-84  as 
did Mexico and Brazil. Again, the three factors are concessional loans, 
high  export  orientation,  and  prudent  management  of  the  maturity 
structure. 
Concessionaf loans. A high proportion of Indonesia’s external debt 
was borrowed at fixed concessionary rates from IGGI (see items b and 114  Wing Thye WooIAnwar Nasution 
Table 5.2  Debt and Export Characteristics of  Mexico, Brazil, and Indonesia 
1980  1981  1982  I983  1984  1985  1986 
a. All Short- and Long-Term Debt Service as Ratio of  Exports (%) 
Mexico  103.6  117.1  138.9  80.8  69.0  66.5  n.a. 
Brazil  114.5  113.6  146.0  104.5  72.1  72.6  n.a. 
Indonesia  25.1  26. I  39.0  41.7  43.3  51.6  67.6 
b. Proportion of Publicly-Guaranteed Long-Term Debt that has Variable Rate (%) 
Mexico  71.5  75.4  76.7  82.7  83.6  80.1  n.a. 
Brazil  61.0  67.1  69.3  70.1  73.1  71.5  n.a. 
Indonesia  16.2  17.8  20.0  22.8  23.7  21.7  n.a. 
c. Effective Interest Rate for All Long-Term Debt (%) 
Mexico  22.8  20. I  20.8  15.9  18.0  16.1  n.a. 
Brazil  23.3  23.7  23.0  13.9  11.7  11.2  n.a. 
Indonesia  15.5  16.6  16.  I  14.6  15.8  16.6  14.5 
d. Export to GNP Ratio (%) 
Mexico  13.7  13.2  17.9  21.5  20.1  17.8  n.a. 
Brazil  9.6  10.2  8.7  12.4  15.3  14.0  n.a. 
Indonesia  29.7  27.9  23.6  25.8  25.7  25.1  22.6 
e. Proportion of Debt that is Short Term (%) 
Mexico  28.3  32.1  30.5  11.1  6.8  5.8  n.a. 
Brazil  19.3  19.2  19.3  14.9  11.6  10.8  n.a. 
Indonesia  13.3  14.4  18.1  15.6  16.8  14.8  12.2 
Sources: All calculations are based on data in World  Bank, World debt tables (1986187). 
1986 figures for Indonesia are from World  Bank, Indonesia, Strategy for  economic. re- 
covery (May 1985). 
Note: Effective interest rate is calculated by (debt serviceldebt). 
c).  This  “IGGI  effect”  explains  why  the effective  interest  rate  on 
Indonesian long-run debt averaged  16  percent against the 20  percent 
paid by  Mexico and Brazil. Another result was that only about one- 
third  of  Indonesian  debt  was  denominated  in  dollars  compared  to 
90 percent of Mexican and Brazilian debt. This meant that the large 
appreciation of the dollar from 1979 to 1982 did not raise the effective 
interest rate for Indonesia as much as it did for Mexico and Brazil. 
High export orientation. The availability of  significant amounts of 
other tradables prevented Indonesia’s debt-servicing capacity from col- 
lapsing as did Mexico’s when the price of  oil dropped in early  1982. 
Appropriate exchange rate policies by  Indonesia, exemplified by the 
1978 devaluation, ensured a diversified export bundle as well as a high 
export orientation. The average 1980-82 export/GNP ratio was 27 per- 
cent for Indonesia, but only 14 percent for Mexico and 9.5 percent for 
Brazil (see item d). Indonesia’s political concern to keep the agricultural 
sector  vibrant  no  doubt  helped  to  maintain  the  observed  export 
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Prudent management  of the maturity structure. This was evident in 
that only 14 percent of Indonesia’s debt in 1981 was short term, com- 
pared to the 19 percent for Brazil and 32 percent for Mexico (see item 
e). The shock of the 1975 Pertamina crisis caused official borrowing in 
Indonesia to take place very cautiously with regard to exposure in the 
short-term credit market. We  can also refer to this third factor as the 
Pertamina legacy. 
Capital flight has often been mentioned as a cause of the debt crisis 
in some Latin American countries.* We suspect, however, that impru- 
dent maturity structure management may have contributed more to the 
Mexican  debt-servicing  difficulties than capital flight per se. To  see 
this, we allowed capital flight to have the maximum impact on the actual 
DSO by assuming that Mexico financed the capital flight entirely with 
short-term debt.9  We  find that DSO in  1982 would have dropped from 
138 percent to 64 percent if  financing were done with long-term loans 
instead. Without capital flight, DSO would  have been 45 percent. In 
short, the major reason Mexico’s DSO was so high was that the way 
in which the government financed the capital flight added 74 percentage 
points. Capital flight per se added only 19 percentage points. 
Our conclusion of imprudence in management of maturity structure 
can be shown in another way. To see that much of the Mexican short- 
term debt consisted of borrowing by the government rather than by 
commercial credits to finance imports, we recall that the Indonesian 
government, since the 1975  Pertamina crisis, had avoided short-term 
external borrowing as much as possible. Assuming that the Indonesian 
ratio of short-term debt to imports reflects normal trade financing, we 
can attribute 77 percent of Mexican short-term debt in  1981 and 1982 
to government borrowing.  The  1981  and  1982 figures for Brazil  are 
68 percent and 57 percent, respectively. 
There is a trade-off in external debt management between generally 
lower interest payments and predictability of debt-service payments. 
Short-term liabilities pay lower interest rates most of the time, but it 
is risky to rely on a strategy which rolls over a large amount of short- 
term debt every period. An unforeseen credit crunch would force the 
country to increase borrowing in order to cover its interest payments. 
If  this credit squeeze were to persist for more than three years, and 
was accompanied by a prolonged fall in the country’s exports, the extra 
borrowing  would  be difficult  to sustain as the situation increasingly 
smacked of a Ponzi game. 
5.8  Conclusions and Prospects 
To quantify the relative importance of the three factors in explaining 
the absence of an Indonesia debt crisis, we calculated what the total 116  Wing Thye WooIAnwar Nasution 
debt-service ratios in the 1980-82 period would have been if Indonesian 
debt was paying the same effective interest rates as Mexico, as well 
as bearing the same maturity structure, and if the Indonesian export- 
GNP ratio was identical to Mexico's.Io 
The  average  values  of  the  six  possible  decompositions  of  the 
effect of  each factor and the range of  values achieved  are reported 
in  table  5.3. 
The decomposition identifies the export orientation of Indonesia as 
the most decisive factor in why Indonesia's total debt-service/export 
ratio was so low compared with Mexico's. Export orientation explained 
31 of the 54 percentage point difference, accounting for 57 percent of 
the gap. The Pertamina legacy was of moderate importance. It con- 
tributed 18 percentage points, accounting for almost a third of the gap. 
Concessional interest rates and currency composition of debt played 
only a minor role in reducing the debt-service ratio, less than 6 per- 
centage points. 
Our finding that  the  IGGI  effect  contributed  so little toward  the 
reduction of the 1980-82 debt service/export ratio is surprising because 
many  of  the informed observers we  talked  to cited  foreign conces- 
sionary loans as the primary reason for the absence of an Indonesian 
debt crisis. Our point  is that while the  $1  billion  saved annually in 
reduced debt service during  1980-82"  is a large sum of money, this 
amount would have been easily swamped by  a Mexico-style loss of 
reserves if  the Indonesian government had tried to prop up an over- 
valued  exchange rate  and  was  then  forced to  finance capital flight. 
Similarly, if  exports were 12 percent below actual value because of an 
overvalued exchange rate, as suggested by  the  1965-68  experience, 
the  loss  in  foreign reserves wouid  also have  greatly  exceeded  this 
$1  billion saving. 
Our conclusion is that Indonesian exchange rate policy was the most 
important reason why Indonesia was able to meet its debt commitments 
Table 5.3  Average Values and Range of Values Achieved 
Average  Range of Values 
Value  for Each Factor 
Hypothetical 1980-82  average total  84.4 
debt-service ratio when Indonesia 
had all 3 Mexican features 
Contribution of  (in percentage points): 
IGGl  5.8  3.7 - 8.4 
Maturity management  17.7  12.0 -  23.8 
Export orientation  30.8  23.6 -  37.8 
Actual 1980-82  average total 
debt-service ratio 
30. I 117  Economic Policies in  Indonesia and External  Debt 
in the 1982-84  period. The conduct of this exchange rate policy was 
greatly facilitated by  the existence of a political lobby that promoted 
exchange rate protection, and by  the memory of  the economy-wide 
negative effects of  exchange rate overvaluation. The fact that neither 
the budget deficits nor the money growth  rates departed from their 
historical  range for extended periods  also helped to make exchange 
rate management easier. 
While the decline of oil prices in early 1982 did make debt manage- 
ment more difficult-the  total debt-service ratio rose from 26 percent 
in 1981 to 39 percent in  1982-it  was still far from a crisis situation. 
The subsequent collapse of agricultural commodity prices and the rapid 
descent of  the price of oil in  1986 from $28/barrel in January to $lo/ 
barrel in August have produced a more ominous situation. The fall in 
export earnings from $21 billion in  1982 to $15 billion in 1986 has caused 
the total debt-service ratio to soar to 68 percent. 
While our analysis would place great emphasis upon an aggressive 
competitive real exchange policy to reduce the probability of  a debt 
crisis through its effects on exports and capital flight, there are a number 
of other policies which can also be implemented given the recent drastic 
jump in the debt service-export ratio. The supplementary policies can 
be divided into two groups: (1) those that affect the debt service directly, 
and (2) those that affect export earnings. 
Policy measures that could ameliorate the debt service burden di- 
rectly, through reduction of foreign borrowing, are: 
a. Cuts in the budget deficits by controlling spending and increasing 
taxes. This would keep fiscal policy consistent with exchange rate 
policy. The tax reforms since January  1984 have raised domestic 
revenue considerably, but their implementation has not been wholly 
satisfactory.  While the  number  of registered  taxpayers has  in- 
creased to 995,000 at the end of 1985 from 550,000 before the tax 
reform, only 50 percent of the companies and 70 percent of reg- 
istered individual taxpayers actually filed tax returns in 1985. 
b.  Maintenance of  an anti-inflationary posture in  monetary policy. 
This would make real exchange rate management easier by keep- 
ing trade deficits down and capital flight low. 
c. Amending the balanced budget rule to allow internal financing of 
government deficits. As long as there is DO automatic monetization 
of  budget  deficits,  it  may  make  little  sense not  to amend  the 
balanced budget practice in order to reduce reliance on external 
funds. The deepening of the domestic market in government se- 
curities would make open-market operations by the central bank 
easier. The addition of this monetary tool to SBI and SBPU would 
tend to enhance monetary control, and thus macroeconomic sta- 
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d. Acceleration of the development of the domestic financial system. 
Besides further deregulation of the financial sector, financial deep- 
ening could be boosted by the privatization of many of the state- 
owned enterprises. The balance-of-payments  position  would be 
improved if the government were to allow foreigners to purchase 
shares in the former state enterprises. A developed financial mar- 
ket could lower intermediation costs, allow better monetary con- 
trol, and, possibly, encourage savings. 
e. Liberalization of the controls on foreign investments in the man- 
ufacturing and agricultural sector, especially in industries which 
produce primarily for the export markets. 
A second group of supplementary  external debt management policies 
would be those which focus on the denominator of the debt-service 
ratio.  Our analyses indicate  that the  viability  and  expansion of  the 




The elimination of the wide array of monopoly import licenses. 
The present efforts to replace  import licenses  with  tariffs  is a 
second-best solution. The growth of manufactured exports, spurred 
by access to cheaper inputs, would not only increase foreign ex- 
change earnings but would also diversify the export bundle, hence 
reducing the sensitivity of the debt-service ratio to the prices of 
a few key commodity exports. 
The expansion of the tree crop sector. Indonesia has cheaper labor 
than Malaysia, and with additional investments in transportation, 
Indonesia could potentially outproduce Malaysia in rubber and 
palm oil. In addition to earning more foreign exchange, the strat- 
egy of accelerating the growth of agricultural export industries 
would promote a more equitable, rural-urban-as  well as inter- 
island-growth  pattern, and ease population pressure on the ur- 
ban areas. 
final cautionary word on external debt management from the po-  - 
litical perspective is pertinent. The Pertamina crisis has led to close 
supervision by  the Ministry  of Finance of external borrowing by all 
state enterprises, making it unlikely that a debt crisis would ever again 
emerge from the external adventurism of an economic fiefdom. The 
new danger now may  be the absorption of  private external debts in 
order to save large domestic firms when they get into financial prob- 
lems, as in the Indocement case. In July 1985, Indocement, the biggest 
cement company in Indonesia, began to experience cash flow problems 
because the recession-induced collapse of the construction industry led 
to a cement glut. The response of the Indonesian government was to 
inject  US$325  million  in  cash to acquire a  35  percent  share of  the 
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into a rupiah liability a US120  million syndicated loan that Indocement 
took out in  1981.”’2 
In a few more such rescues are allowed, then the habit may well be 
impossible to break without the government having to put to the test 
the source of  its political legitimacy-the  cohesiveness of  the bureau- 
cratic and military elite.  Given the widespread  participation  in large 
private business ventures by government officials and their family mem- 
bers, the selective use  of financial rescue will  threaten the political 
unity of  the group. If this kind of political pressure were to be able to 
completely eradicate the already blurred line between public and large 
private enterprises, then the vulnerability of Indonesia to a debt crisis 
would be greatly increased. External debt management would become 
impossible because no one would know what the size of the sovereign 
debt really  is, and the size of this debt could increase very  quickly 
given the openness of the private capital account. 
Notes 
I. The concept of exchange rate protection is developed in detail by Corden 
(1 982). 
2. The “balanced”  budget  rule ceased to be  a binding constraint on ex- 
penditure after the 1973 OPEC-I price increase. The Indonesian government 
(perhaps until very recently) was pretty much able to get whatever amount of 
credit it wanted. This budget rule does not prevent the financing of nonbudget- 
ary expenditure by money creation, e.g., central bank credits to state agencies. 
3. The first two PT/PN proxies are calculated from table 3 in Warr (1986), 
but some of our figures differ from those in his table 4. 
4. We are abstracting from natural growth considerations here to make this 
point within a static context. 
5. Current account expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
6. A textbook exposition of this fiscal cause of external debt crisis is Rivera- 
Batiz and Rivera-Batiz (1985, 557-61). 
7. If a private borrower could not come up with  the service payments in 
domestic currency for his  private  nonguaranteed  external debt, we do not 
consider it a national debt crisis because the government did not cause the 
default (except in  the broadest sense of not creating more favorable macro- 
economic conditions, if  it were able to do so). 
8. For example, Dornbusch (1987);  Lever  and Huhne (1986);  and Cline (1984). 
9. Kahn and Haque (1987) estimate cumulated Mexican capital flight up to 
10. This decomposition of  DSO is from Woo (1987b). 
11. This is calculated assuming that Indonesia would pay the same effective 
interest rate as Mexico. 
12. Quote is from Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 July 1985. The Asiun 
Wall Street Journal  Weekly (12 May  1986) put  the cash injection at US$360 
million. 
1982 to be $29 billion. Actual short-term debt in  1982 is $26 billion. 120  Wing Thye WooIAnwar Nasution 
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